WASHINGTON, D.C. – September 9, 2026 – INCOMPAS, the competitive communications and AI infrastructure association, filed comments with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in response to the Commission’s Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking examining additional steps to strengthen the equipment authorization program against national security risks to the communications supply chain.
The following statement can be attributed to Staci L. Pies, Senior Vice President of Government Relations and Policy at INCOMPAS:
“INCOMPAS members build and operate the communications networks, cloud facilities and data centers that provide the physical foundation for American leadership in artificial intelligence, and delays in obtaining necessary equipment or unnecessary duplication in authorization procedures can slow infrastructure construction and make it harder for American companies to compete at the pace the global AI race demands. INCOMPAS shares the Commission’s commitment to national security and secure communications supply chains, but broad or ambiguous rules can exclude trusted products and divert resources away from infrastructure deployment without materially improving security.
American technological leadership and national security are mutually reinforcing. The most durable supply chain protections are those that rest on the defined process Congress established, which specify national security sources determine the risks that support Covered List entries. Adhering to that process preserves the ability of American companies to build the infrastructure on which the nation’s economic and security interests increasingly depend. INCOMPAS looks forward to continuing to work with the Commission on strengthening the security of the nation’s communications supply chain and the adoption of our recommendations.”
In its filing, INCOMPAS highlighted several key points:
- Modern communications and computing equipment rely on complex, multi-tiered supply chains. Broad or ambiguous rules risk excluding trusted products and exposing equipment-authorization applicants to liability for information they cannot independently verify.
- Congress established a defined process for addressing supply chain risks: designated national security sources make the determinations supporting Covered List entries while directing the Commission to implement, not expand, these determinations, through the equipment authorization process.
- The Commission’s definition of “produced by” should remain closely tied to the underlying national security determination and should not extend the Covered List prohibition beyond the scope of that determination.
- Section 302(a) of the Communications Act authorizes rules addressing the interference potential of radiofrequency devices. That authority can support software requirements tied to RF compliance, but it does not, by its terms, create general authority to regulate the provenance of every component incorporated into a device.
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